* Store precalculated transactions in an `Arc`
Transaction `Hash`es are 32 bytes,
and the minimun transparent transaction size is 54 bytes.
So a full 2MB block can create 1.1MB of transaction hashes.
We use an `Arc` to avoid repeatedly cloning that much data.
* Remove the unused `Block` from `ChainTipBlock`
This drops the block as soon as it isn't needed any more.
Previously, it would stick around until every `ChainTipReceiver`
dropped their `ChainTipBlock`, even if they didn't use the `Block`
at all.
* Return a transaction verifier from `zebra_consensus::init`
This verifier is temporarily created separately from the block verifier's
transaction verifier.
* Return the same transaction verifier used by the block verifier
* Clarify that the mempool verifier is the transaction verifier
Co-authored-by: Deirdre Connolly <deirdre@zfnd.org>
Co-authored-by: Deirdre Connolly <deirdre@zfnd.org>
Co-authored-by: Conrado Gouvea <conrado@zfnd.org>
* add value pools to the database
* remove redundant genesis block check
* use update_with_chain_value_pool_change()
* remove constrains
* remove height from the database
* remove calls to chain_value_pool_change
* clippy
* use the "correct" value balances
* bump the database format
* remove everything that is not finalized state
* clippy
* rustfmt
* use all spent utxos
* add new_outputs utxos to all_utxos_spent_by_block
* remove panic
* add finalized state value pool test
* clippy
* clippy 2
* move import
* fix import
* rustfmt
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
* Add an OrderedUtxo type for validation of spends within a block
This change allows us to check that transparent spends use outputs from
earlier in their block. (But we don't actually do that check yet.)
We need to keep the order of UTXOs when we're contextually verifying
each new block that is added to a chain. But the block order is
irrelevant for UTXOs stored in the state.
* Take ownership in utxos_from_ordered_utxos
* Delete a confusing comment
As a side effect of computing Merkle roots, we build a list of
transaction hashes. Instead of discarding these, add them to
PreparedBlock and FinalizedBlock so that they can be reused rather than
recomputed.
This commit adds Merkle root validation to:
1. the block verifier;
2. the checkpoint verifier.
In the first case, Bitcoin Merkle tree malleability has no effect,
because only a single Merkle tree in each malleablity set is valid (the
others have duplicate transactions).
In the second case, we need to check that the Merkle tree does not contain any
duplicate transactions.
Closes#1385Closes#906
This commit changes the state system and database format to track the
provenance of UTXOs, in addition to the outputs themselves.
Specifically, it tracks the following additional metadata:
- the height at which the UTXO was created;
- whether or not the UTXO was created from a coinbase transaction or
not.
This metadata will allow us to:
- check the coinbase maturity consensus rule;
- check the coinbase inputs => no transparent outputs rule;
- implement lookup of transactions by utxo (using the height to find the
block and then scanning the block) for a future RPC mechanism.
Closes#1342
This change introduces two new types:
- `PreparedBlock`, representing a block which has undergone semantic
validation and has been prepared for contextual validation;
- `FinalizedBlock`, representing a block which is ready to be finalized
immediately;
and changes the `Request::CommitBlock`,`Request::CommitFinalizedBlock`
variants to use these types instead of their previous fields.
This change solves the problem of passing data between semantic
validation and contextual validation, and cleans up the state code by
allowing it to pass around a bundle of data. Previously, the state code
just passed around an `Arc<Block>`, which forced it to needlessly
recompute block hashes and other data, and was incompatible with the
already-known but not-yet-implemented data transfer requirements, namely
passing in the Sprout and Sapling anchors computed during contextual
validation.
This commit propagates the `PreparedBlock` and `FinalizedBlock` types
through the state code but only uses their data opportunistically, e.g.,
changing .hash() computations to use the precomputed hash. In the
future, these structures can be extended to pass data through the
verification pipeline for reuse as appropriate. For instance, these
changes allow the sprout and sapling anchors to be propagated through
the state.
The UTXO query system assumes that a transaction will only request
information about UTXOs created in prior blocks. But transactions are
allowed to spend UTXOs created by prior transactions in the same block.
This doesn't fit with the existing query model, so instead of trying to
change it, allow the script verifier to take an additional set of known
UTXOs, and propagate this set from the block.
The BlockVerifier constructed a tracing span and manually entered it
inside of an async block. Manually entering spans inside async blocks
can cause problems where the span might not be entered and exited
correctly as the resulting future is polled. Instead, using the
.instrument creates a wrapper future that handles the bookkeeping.
I changed the span name and contents to be consistent with the spans in
the checkpoint verifier.
This reduces the API surface to the minimum required for functionality,
and cleans up module documentation. The stub mempool module is deleted
entirely, since it will need to be redone later anyways.
To match the other check::* functions.
Automated commit, created using the script:
sed -i 's/subsidy_is_correct/subsidy_is_valid/' \
$(grep -r subsidy_is_correct zebra* | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u)
* add general and founders reward subsidy modules
* validate founders reward
* Use funding streams after Canopy on testnet
ZIP-1014 only applies to mainnet, where Canopy is at the first halving.
On testnet, Canopy is before the first halving, and the dev fund rules
apply from Canopy. (See ZIP-214.)
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* pass all test vectors through current subsidy validation
* Add testnet and halving subsidy tests
* add subsidy validation error tests
* rename block validation methods
* add network to block verifier
* add amount operators
* Implement Ord, Eq, and Hash for Amount
* Implement Add<Height> for Height
And make the existing Height operators do range checks.
* Apply operator suggestions
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
* refactor block and tx validation errors
* rename errors module to error
* move NoTransactions to BlockError
* clarify some errors, use dbg format for hash in error
* mnake is_coinbase_first return BlockError
* add new error types for each consensus Service
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jane@zfnd.org>
This is a really nice function but there might be a bug in its future
implementation: https://github.com/tower-rs/tower/issues/469
This bug may have already been fixed for the 0.4.0 release, so we could change
back then.
Instead of conditionally parsing the hardcoded checkpoint list and
optionally making a CheckpointVerifier, make one unconditionally, and
use the config settings to decide whether to route responses to it.
Then, fix up all of the places needed to make it compile and remove all
of the dead code.
This disables one test that can't be easily fixed at the moment, because
it tests the wrong thing: the checkpoint and block verifiers will
produce different transcripts.
It also disables the initial_tip logic for now, pending simplification
of the ChainVerifier logic.
* stop committing to the state in the ChainVerifier
* commit to the state in the BlockVerifier
* commit to the state in the CheckpointVerifier
Co-authored-by: Jane Lusby <jlusby42@gmail.com>
This is the first in a sequence of changes that change the block:: items
to not include Block as a prefix in their name, in accordance with the
Rust API guidelines.
Log a message with the height when we get duplicate blocks.
Downgrade some verifier errors and warnings to info and debug, because
some peers on mainnet consistently provide bad blocks.