Zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs

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use std::{
collections::HashMap,
future::Future,
iter::FromIterator,
pin::Pin,
sync::Arc,
task::{Context, Poll},
};
use futures::{
stream::{FuturesUnordered, StreamExt},
FutureExt,
};
use tower::{Service, ServiceExt};
use tracing::Instrument;
use zebra_chain::{
block, orchard,
parameters::{Network, NetworkUpgrade},
primitives::Groth16Proof,
sapling,
transaction::{self, HashType, SigHash, Transaction},
transparent,
};
use zebra_script::CachedFfiTransaction;
use zebra_state as zs;
use crate::{error::TransactionError, primitives, script, BoxError};
mod check;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
/// Asynchronous transaction verification.
///
/// # Correctness
///
/// Transaction verification requests should be wrapped in a timeout, so that
/// out-of-order and invalid requests do not hang indefinitely. See the [`chain`](`crate::chain`)
/// module documentation for details.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Verifier<ZS> {
network: Network,
script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
}
impl<ZS> Verifier<ZS>
where
ZS: Service<zs::Request, Response = zs::Response, Error = BoxError> + Send + Clone + 'static,
ZS::Future: Send + 'static,
{
pub fn new(network: Network, script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>) -> Self {
Self {
network,
script_verifier,
}
}
}
/// Specifies whether a transaction should be verified as part of a block or as
/// part of the mempool.
///
/// Transaction verification has slightly different consensus rules, depending on
/// whether the transaction is to be included in a block on in the mempool.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub enum Request {
/// Verify the supplied transaction as part of a block.
Block {
/// The transaction itself.
transaction: Arc<Transaction>,
/// Additional UTXOs which are known at the time of verification.
known_utxos: Arc<HashMap<transparent::OutPoint, zs::Utxo>>,
/// The height of the block containing this transaction.
height: block::Height,
},
/// Verify the supplied transaction as part of the mempool.
///
/// Mempool transactions do not have any additional UTXOs.
///
/// Note: coinbase transactions are invalid in the mempool
Mempool {
/// The transaction itself.
transaction: Arc<Transaction>,
/// The height of the next block.
///
/// The next block is the first block that could possibly contain a
/// mempool transaction.
height: block::Height,
},
}
impl Request {
/// The transaction to verify that's in this request.
pub fn transaction(&self) -> Arc<Transaction> {
match self {
Request::Block { transaction, .. } => transaction.clone(),
Request::Mempool { transaction, .. } => transaction.clone(),
}
}
/// The set of additional known unspent transaction outputs that's in this request.
pub fn known_utxos(&self) -> Arc<HashMap<transparent::OutPoint, zs::Utxo>> {
match self {
Request::Block { known_utxos, .. } => known_utxos.clone(),
Request::Mempool { .. } => HashMap::new().into(),
}
}
/// The height used to select the consensus rules for verifying this transaction.
pub fn height(&self) -> block::Height {
match self {
Request::Block { height, .. } | Request::Mempool { height, .. } => *height,
}
}
/// The network upgrade to consider for the verification.
///
/// This is based on the block height from the request, and the supplied `network`.
pub fn upgrade(&self, network: Network) -> NetworkUpgrade {
NetworkUpgrade::current(network, self.height())
}
}
impl<ZS> Service<Request> for Verifier<ZS>
where
ZS: Service<zs::Request, Response = zs::Response, Error = BoxError> + Send + Clone + 'static,
ZS::Future: Send + 'static,
{
type Response = transaction::Hash;
type Error = TransactionError;
type Future =
Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>> + Send + 'static>>;
fn poll_ready(&mut self, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
// TODO: break up each chunk into its own method
fn call(&mut self, req: Request) -> Self::Future {
let is_mempool = match req {
Request::Block { .. } => false,
Request::Mempool { .. } => true,
};
if is_mempool {
// XXX determine exactly which rules apply to mempool transactions
unimplemented!("Zebra does not yet have a mempool (#2309)");
}
let script_verifier = self.script_verifier.clone();
let network = self.network;
let tx = req.transaction();
let span = tracing::debug_span!("tx", hash = %tx.hash());
async move {
tracing::trace!(?tx);
// Do basic checks first
check::has_inputs_and_outputs(&tx)?;
if tx.is_coinbase() {
check::coinbase_tx_no_prevout_joinsplit_spend(&tx)?;
}
// [Canopy onward]: `vpub_old` MUST be zero.
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#joinsplitdesc
check::disabled_add_to_sprout_pool(&tx, req.height(), network)?;
// "The consensus rules applied to valueBalance, vShieldedOutput, and bindingSig
// in non-coinbase transactions MUST also be applied to coinbase transactions."
//
// This rule is implicitly implemented during Sapling and Orchard verification,
// because they do not distinguish between coinbase and non-coinbase transactions.
//
// Note: this rule originally applied to Sapling, but we assume it also applies to Orchard.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/zip-0213#specification
let async_checks = match tx.as_ref() {
Transaction::V1 { .. } | Transaction::V2 { .. } | Transaction::V3 { .. } => {
tracing::debug!(?tx, "got transaction with wrong version");
return Err(TransactionError::WrongVersion);
}
Transaction::V4 {
inputs,
// outputs,
// lock_time,
// expiry_height,
joinsplit_data,
sapling_shielded_data,
..
} => Self::verify_v4_transaction(
req,
network,
script_verifier,
inputs,
joinsplit_data,
sapling_shielded_data,
)?,
Transaction::V5 {
inputs,
sapling_shielded_data,
orchard_shielded_data,
..
} => Self::verify_v5_transaction(
req,
network,
script_verifier,
inputs,
sapling_shielded_data,
orchard_shielded_data,
)?,
};
async_checks.check().await?;
Ok(tx.hash())
}
.instrument(span)
.boxed()
}
}
impl<ZS> Verifier<ZS>
where
ZS: Service<zs::Request, Response = zs::Response, Error = BoxError> + Send + Clone + 'static,
ZS::Future: Send + 'static,
{
/// Verify a V4 transaction.
///
/// Returns a set of asynchronous checks that must all succeed for the transaction to be
/// considered valid. These checks include:
///
/// - transparent transfers
/// - sprout shielded data
/// - sapling shielded data
///
/// The parameters of this method are:
///
/// - the `request` to verify (that contains the transaction and other metadata, see [`Request`]
/// for more information)
/// - the `network` to consider when verifying
/// - the `script_verifier` to use for verifying the transparent transfers
/// - the transparent `inputs` in the transaction
/// - the Sprout `joinsplit_data` shielded data in the transaction
/// - the `sapling_shielded_data` in the transaction
fn verify_v4_transaction(
request: Request,
network: Network,
script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
inputs: &[transparent::Input],
joinsplit_data: &Option<transaction::JoinSplitData<Groth16Proof>>,
sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<sapling::PerSpendAnchor>>,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
let tx = request.transaction();
let upgrade = request.upgrade(network);
let shielded_sighash = tx.sighash(upgrade, HashType::ALL, None);
Ok(
Self::verify_transparent_inputs_and_outputs(
&request,
network,
inputs,
script_verifier,
)?
.and(Self::verify_sprout_shielded_data(
joinsplit_data,
&shielded_sighash,
))
.and(Self::verify_sapling_shielded_data(
sapling_shielded_data,
&shielded_sighash,
)?),
)
}
/// Verify a V5 transaction.
///
/// Returns a set of asynchronous checks that must all succeed for the transaction to be
/// considered valid. These checks include:
///
/// - transaction support by the considered network upgrade (see [`Request::upgrade`])
/// - transparent transfers
/// - sapling shielded data (TODO)
/// - orchard shielded data (TODO)
///
/// The parameters of this method are:
///
/// - the `request` to verify (that contains the transaction and other metadata, see [`Request`]
/// for more information)
/// - the `network` to consider when verifying
/// - the `script_verifier` to use for verifying the transparent transfers
/// - the transparent `inputs` in the transaction
/// - the sapling shielded data of the transaction, if any
/// - the orchard shielded data of the transaction, if any
fn verify_v5_transaction(
request: Request,
network: Network,
script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
inputs: &[transparent::Input],
sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<sapling::SharedAnchor>>,
orchard_shielded_data: &Option<orchard::ShieldedData>,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
let transaction = request.transaction();
let upgrade = request.upgrade(network);
let shielded_sighash = transaction.sighash(upgrade, HashType::ALL, None);
Self::verify_v5_transaction_network_upgrade(&transaction, upgrade)?;
let _async_checks = Self::verify_transparent_inputs_and_outputs(
&request,
network,
inputs,
script_verifier,
)?
.and(Self::verify_sapling_shielded_data(
sapling_shielded_data,
&shielded_sighash,
)?)
.and(Self::verify_orchard_shielded_data(
orchard_shielded_data,
&shielded_sighash,
)?);
// TODO:
// - verify orchard shielded pool (ZIP-224) (#2105)
// - ZIP-216 (#1798)
// - ZIP-244 (#1874)
// - validate bindingSigOrchard (#2103)
// - remaining consensus rules (#2379)
// - remove `should_panic` from tests
unimplemented!("V5 transaction validation is not yet complete");
}
/// Verifies if a V5 `transaction` is supported by `network_upgrade`.
fn verify_v5_transaction_network_upgrade(
transaction: &Transaction,
network_upgrade: NetworkUpgrade,
) -> Result<(), TransactionError> {
match network_upgrade {
// Supports V5 transactions
NetworkUpgrade::Nu5 => Ok(()),
// Does not support V5 transactions
NetworkUpgrade::Genesis
| NetworkUpgrade::BeforeOverwinter
| NetworkUpgrade::Overwinter
| NetworkUpgrade::Sapling
| NetworkUpgrade::Blossom
| NetworkUpgrade::Heartwood
| NetworkUpgrade::Canopy => Err(TransactionError::UnsupportedByNetworkUpgrade(
transaction.version(),
network_upgrade,
)),
}
}
/// Verifies if a transaction's transparent `inputs` are valid using the provided
/// `script_verifier`.
fn verify_transparent_inputs_and_outputs(
request: &Request,
network: Network,
inputs: &[transparent::Input],
script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
let transaction = request.transaction();
if transaction.is_coinbase() {
// The script verifier only verifies PrevOut inputs and their corresponding UTXOs.
// Coinbase transactions don't have any PrevOut inputs.
Ok(AsyncChecks::new())
} else {
// feed all of the inputs to the script and shielded verifiers
// the script_verifier also checks transparent sighashes, using its own implementation
let cached_ffi_transaction = Arc::new(CachedFfiTransaction::new(transaction));
let known_utxos = request.known_utxos();
let upgrade = request.upgrade(network);
let script_checks = (0..inputs.len())
.into_iter()
.map(move |input_index| {
let request = script::Request {
upgrade,
known_utxos: known_utxos.clone(),
cached_ffi_transaction: cached_ffi_transaction.clone(),
input_index,
};
script_verifier.clone().oneshot(request)
})
.collect();
Ok(script_checks)
}
}
/// Verifies a transaction's Sprout shielded join split data.
fn verify_sprout_shielded_data(
joinsplit_data: &Option<transaction::JoinSplitData<Groth16Proof>>,
shielded_sighash: &SigHash,
) -> AsyncChecks {
let mut checks = AsyncChecks::new();
if let Some(joinsplit_data) = joinsplit_data {
// XXX create a method on JoinSplitData
// that prepares groth16::Items with the correct proofs
// and proof inputs, handling interstitial treestates
// correctly.
// Then, pass those items to self.joinsplit to verify them.
// Consensus rule: The joinSplitSig MUST represent a
// valid signature, under joinSplitPubKey, of the
// sighash.
//
// Queue the validation of the JoinSplit signature while
// adding the resulting future to our collection of
// async checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#sproutnonmalleability
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnencodingandconsensus
let ed25519_verifier = primitives::ed25519::VERIFIER.clone();
let ed25519_item =
(joinsplit_data.pub_key, joinsplit_data.sig, shielded_sighash).into();
checks.push(ed25519_verifier.oneshot(ed25519_item));
}
checks
}
/// Verifies a transaction's Sapling shielded data.
fn verify_sapling_shielded_data<A>(
sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<A>>,
shielded_sighash: &SigHash,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError>
where
A: sapling::AnchorVariant + Clone,
sapling::Spend<sapling::PerSpendAnchor>: From<(sapling::Spend<A>, A::Shared)>,
{
let mut async_checks = AsyncChecks::new();
if let Some(sapling_shielded_data) = sapling_shielded_data {
for spend in sapling_shielded_data.spends_per_anchor() {
// Consensus rule: cv and rk MUST NOT be of small
// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]rk
// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#spenddesc
check::spend_cv_rk_not_small_order(&spend)?;
// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKSpend MUST be valid
// given a primary input formed from the other
// fields except spendAuthSig.
//
// Queue the verification of the Groth16 spend proof
// for each Spend description while adding the
// resulting future to our collection of async
// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
async_checks.push(
primitives::groth16::SPEND_VERIFIER
.clone()
.oneshot(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(&spend).into()),
);
// Consensus rule: The spend authorization signature
// MUST be a valid SpendAuthSig signature over
// SigHash using rk as the validating key.
//
// Queue the validation of the RedJubjub spend
// authorization signature for each Spend
// description while adding the resulting future to
// our collection of async checks that (at a
// minimum) must pass for the transaction to verify.
async_checks.push(
primitives::redjubjub::VERIFIER
.clone()
.oneshot((spend.rk, spend.spend_auth_sig, shielded_sighash).into()),
);
}
for output in sapling_shielded_data.outputs() {
// Consensus rule: cv and wpk MUST NOT be of small
// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]wpk
// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
//
// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#outputdesc
check::output_cv_epk_not_small_order(output)?;
// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKOutput MUST be
// valid given a primary input formed from the other
// fields except C^enc and C^out.
//
// Queue the verification of the Groth16 output
// proof for each Output description while adding
// the resulting future to our collection of async
// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
// transaction to verify.
async_checks.push(
primitives::groth16::OUTPUT_VERIFIER
.clone()
.oneshot(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(output).into()),
);
}
let bvk = sapling_shielded_data.binding_verification_key();
async_checks.push(
primitives::redjubjub::VERIFIER
.clone()
.oneshot((bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into()),
);
}
Ok(async_checks)
}
/// Verifies a transaction's Orchard shielded data.
fn verify_orchard_shielded_data(
orchard_shielded_data: &Option<orchard::ShieldedData>,
shielded_sighash: &SigHash,
) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
let mut async_checks = AsyncChecks::new();
if let Some(orchard_shielded_data) = orchard_shielded_data {
for authorized_action in orchard_shielded_data.actions.iter().cloned() {
let (action, spend_auth_sig) = authorized_action.into_parts();
// Consensus rule: The spend authorization signature
// MUST be a valid SpendAuthSig signature over
// SigHash using rk as the validating key.
//
// Queue the validation of the RedPallas spend
// authorization signature for each Action
// description while adding the resulting future to
// our collection of async checks that (at a
// minimum) must pass for the transaction to verify.
async_checks.push(
primitives::redpallas::VERIFIER
.clone()
.oneshot((action.rk, spend_auth_sig, &shielded_sighash).into()),
);
}
}
Ok(async_checks)
}
}
/// A set of unordered asynchronous checks that should succeed.
///
/// A wrapper around [`FuturesUnordered`] with some auxiliary methods.
struct AsyncChecks(FuturesUnordered<Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(), BoxError>> + Send>>>);
impl AsyncChecks {
/// Create an empty set of unordered asynchronous checks.
pub fn new() -> Self {
AsyncChecks(FuturesUnordered::new())
}
/// Push a check into the set.
pub fn push(&mut self, check: impl Future<Output = Result<(), BoxError>> + Send + 'static) {
self.0.push(check.boxed());
}
/// Push a set of checks into the set.
///
/// This method can be daisy-chained.
pub fn and(mut self, checks: AsyncChecks) -> Self {
self.0.extend(checks.0);
self
}
/// Wait until all checks in the set finish.
///
/// If any of the checks fail, this method immediately returns the error and cancels all other
/// checks by dropping them.
async fn check(mut self) -> Result<(), BoxError> {
// Wait for all asynchronous checks to complete
// successfully, or fail verification if they error.
while let Some(check) = self.0.next().await {
tracing::trace!(?check, remaining = self.0.len());
check?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl<F> FromIterator<F> for AsyncChecks
where
F: Future<Output = Result<(), BoxError>> + Send + 'static,
{
fn from_iter<I>(iterator: I) -> Self
where
I: IntoIterator<Item = F>,
{
AsyncChecks(iterator.into_iter().map(FutureExt::boxed).collect())
}
}