589 lines
21 KiB
Rust
589 lines
21 KiB
Rust
use std::{
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collections::HashMap,
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future::Future,
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iter::FromIterator,
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pin::Pin,
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sync::Arc,
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task::{Context, Poll},
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};
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use futures::{
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stream::{FuturesUnordered, StreamExt},
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FutureExt,
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};
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use tower::{Service, ServiceExt};
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use tracing::Instrument;
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use zebra_chain::{
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block,
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parameters::{Network, NetworkUpgrade},
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primitives::Groth16Proof,
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sapling,
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transaction::{self, HashType, Transaction},
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transparent,
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};
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use zebra_script::CachedFfiTransaction;
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use zebra_state as zs;
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use crate::{error::TransactionError, primitives, script, BoxError};
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mod check;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests;
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/// Asynchronous transaction verification.
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///
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/// # Correctness
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///
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/// Transaction verification requests should be wrapped in a timeout, so that
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/// out-of-order and invalid requests do not hang indefinitely. See the [`chain`](`crate::chain`)
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/// module documentation for details.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct Verifier<ZS> {
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network: Network,
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script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
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// spend_verifier: groth16::Verifier,
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// output_verifier: groth16::Verifier,
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// joinsplit_verifier: groth16::Verifier,
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}
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impl<ZS> Verifier<ZS>
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where
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ZS: Service<zs::Request, Response = zs::Response, Error = BoxError> + Send + Clone + 'static,
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ZS::Future: Send + 'static,
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{
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// XXX: how should this struct be constructed?
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pub fn new(network: Network, script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>) -> Self {
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// let (spend_verifier, output_verifier, joinsplit_verifier) = todo!();
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Self {
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network,
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script_verifier,
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// spend_verifier,
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// output_verifier,
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// joinsplit_verifier,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Specifies whether a transaction should be verified as part of a block or as
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/// part of the mempool.
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///
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/// Transaction verification has slightly different consensus rules, depending on
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/// whether the transaction is to be included in a block on in the mempool.
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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pub enum Request {
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/// Verify the supplied transaction as part of a block.
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Block {
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/// The transaction itself.
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transaction: Arc<Transaction>,
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/// Additional UTXOs which are known at the time of verification.
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known_utxos: Arc<HashMap<transparent::OutPoint, zs::Utxo>>,
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/// The height of the block containing this transaction.
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height: block::Height,
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},
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/// Verify the supplied transaction as part of the mempool.
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///
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/// Mempool transactions do not have any additional UTXOs.
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///
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/// Note: coinbase transactions are invalid in the mempool
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Mempool {
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/// The transaction itself.
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transaction: Arc<Transaction>,
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/// The height of the next block.
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///
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/// The next block is the first block that could possibly contain a
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/// mempool transaction.
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height: block::Height,
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},
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}
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impl Request {
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/// The transaction to verify that's in this request.
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pub fn transaction(&self) -> Arc<Transaction> {
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match self {
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Request::Block { transaction, .. } => transaction.clone(),
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Request::Mempool { transaction, .. } => transaction.clone(),
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}
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}
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/// The set of additional known unspent transaction outputs that's in this request.
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pub fn known_utxos(&self) -> Arc<HashMap<transparent::OutPoint, zs::Utxo>> {
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match self {
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Request::Block { known_utxos, .. } => known_utxos.clone(),
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Request::Mempool { .. } => HashMap::new().into(),
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}
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}
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/// The height used to select the consensus rules for verifying this transaction.
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pub fn height(&self) -> block::Height {
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match self {
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Request::Block { height, .. } | Request::Mempool { height, .. } => *height,
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}
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}
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/// The network upgrade to consider for the verification.
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///
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/// This is based on the block height from the request, and the supplied `network`.
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pub fn upgrade(&self, network: Network) -> NetworkUpgrade {
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NetworkUpgrade::current(network, self.height())
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}
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}
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impl<ZS> Service<Request> for Verifier<ZS>
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where
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ZS: Service<zs::Request, Response = zs::Response, Error = BoxError> + Send + Clone + 'static,
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ZS::Future: Send + 'static,
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{
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type Response = transaction::Hash;
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type Error = TransactionError;
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type Future =
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Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>> + Send + 'static>>;
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fn poll_ready(&mut self, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
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Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
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}
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// TODO: break up each chunk into its own method
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fn call(&mut self, req: Request) -> Self::Future {
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let is_mempool = match req {
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Request::Block { .. } => false,
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Request::Mempool { .. } => true,
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};
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if is_mempool {
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// XXX determine exactly which rules apply to mempool transactions
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unimplemented!();
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}
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let script_verifier = self.script_verifier.clone();
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let network = self.network;
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let tx = req.transaction();
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let span = tracing::debug_span!("tx", hash = %tx.hash());
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async move {
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tracing::trace!(?tx);
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// Do basic checks first
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check::has_inputs_and_outputs(&tx)?;
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if tx.is_coinbase() {
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check::coinbase_tx_no_prevout_joinsplit_spend(&tx)?;
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}
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// [Canopy onward]: `vpub_old` MUST be zero.
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// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#joinsplitdesc
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check::disabled_add_to_sprout_pool(&tx, req.height(), network)?;
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// "The consensus rules applied to valueBalance, vShieldedOutput, and bindingSig
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// in non-coinbase transactions MUST also be applied to coinbase transactions."
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//
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// This rule is implicitly implemented during Sapling and Orchard verification,
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// because they do not distinguish between coinbase and non-coinbase transactions.
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//
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// Note: this rule originally applied to Sapling, but we assume it also applies to Orchard.
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//
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// https://zips.z.cash/zip-0213#specification
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let async_checks = match tx.as_ref() {
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Transaction::V1 { .. } | Transaction::V2 { .. } | Transaction::V3 { .. } => {
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tracing::debug!(?tx, "got transaction with wrong version");
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return Err(TransactionError::WrongVersion);
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}
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Transaction::V4 {
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inputs,
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// outputs,
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// lock_time,
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// expiry_height,
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joinsplit_data,
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sapling_shielded_data,
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..
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} => Self::verify_v4_transaction(
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req,
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network,
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script_verifier,
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inputs,
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joinsplit_data,
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sapling_shielded_data,
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)?,
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Transaction::V5 {
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inputs,
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sapling_shielded_data,
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..
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} => Self::verify_v5_transaction(
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req,
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network,
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script_verifier,
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inputs,
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sapling_shielded_data,
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)?,
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};
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async_checks.check().await?;
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Ok(tx.hash())
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}
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.instrument(span)
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.boxed()
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}
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}
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impl<ZS> Verifier<ZS>
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where
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ZS: Service<zs::Request, Response = zs::Response, Error = BoxError> + Send + Clone + 'static,
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ZS::Future: Send + 'static,
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{
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/// Verify a V4 transaction.
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///
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/// Returns a set of asynchronous checks that must all succeed for the transaction to be
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/// considered valid. These checks include:
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///
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/// - transparent transfers
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/// - sprout shielded data
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/// - sapling shielded data
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///
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/// The parameters of this method are:
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///
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/// - the `request` to verify (that contains the transaction and other metadata, see [`Request`]
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/// for more information)
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/// - the `network` to consider when verifying
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/// - the `script_verifier` to use for verifying the transparent transfers
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/// - the transparent `inputs` in the transaction
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/// - the Sprout `joinsplit_data` shielded data in the transaction
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/// - the `sapling_shielded_data` in the transaction
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fn verify_v4_transaction(
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request: Request,
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network: Network,
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script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
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inputs: &[transparent::Input],
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joinsplit_data: &Option<transaction::JoinSplitData<Groth16Proof>>,
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sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<sapling::PerSpendAnchor>>,
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) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
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let tx = request.transaction();
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let upgrade = request.upgrade(network);
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let shielded_sighash = tx.sighash(upgrade, HashType::ALL, None);
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Ok(
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Self::verify_transparent_inputs_and_outputs(
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&request,
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network,
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inputs,
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script_verifier,
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)?
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.and(Self::verify_sprout_shielded_data(
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joinsplit_data,
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&shielded_sighash,
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))
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.and(Self::verify_sapling_shielded_data(
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sapling_shielded_data,
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&shielded_sighash,
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)?),
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)
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}
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/// Verify a V5 transaction.
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///
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/// Returns a set of asynchronous checks that must all succeed for the transaction to be
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/// considered valid. These checks include:
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///
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/// - transaction support by the considered network upgrade (see [`Request::upgrade`])
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/// - transparent transfers
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/// - sapling shielded data (TODO)
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/// - orchard shielded data (TODO)
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///
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/// The parameters of this method are:
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///
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/// - the `request` to verify (that contains the transaction and other metadata, see [`Request`]
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/// for more information)
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/// - the `network` to consider when verifying
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/// - the `script_verifier` to use for verifying the transparent transfers
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/// - the transparent `inputs` in the transaction
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fn verify_v5_transaction(
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request: Request,
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network: Network,
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script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
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inputs: &[transparent::Input],
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sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<sapling::SharedAnchor>>,
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) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
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let transaction = request.transaction();
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let upgrade = request.upgrade(network);
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let shielded_sighash = transaction.sighash(upgrade, HashType::ALL, None);
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Self::verify_v5_transaction_network_upgrade(&transaction, upgrade)?;
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let _async_checks = Self::verify_transparent_inputs_and_outputs(
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&request,
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network,
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inputs,
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script_verifier,
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)?
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.and(Self::verify_sapling_shielded_data(
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sapling_shielded_data,
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&shielded_sighash,
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)?);
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// TODO:
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// - verify orchard shielded pool (ZIP-224) (#2105)
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// - ZIP-216 (#1798)
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// - ZIP-244 (#1874)
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// - validate bindingSigOrchard (#2103)
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// - remaining consensus rules (#2379)
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// - remove `should_panic` from tests
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unimplemented!("V5 transaction validation is not yet complete");
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}
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/// Verifies if a V5 `transaction` is supported by `network_upgrade`.
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fn verify_v5_transaction_network_upgrade(
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transaction: &Transaction,
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network_upgrade: NetworkUpgrade,
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) -> Result<(), TransactionError> {
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match network_upgrade {
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// Supports V5 transactions
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NetworkUpgrade::Nu5 => Ok(()),
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// Does not support V5 transactions
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NetworkUpgrade::Genesis
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| NetworkUpgrade::BeforeOverwinter
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| NetworkUpgrade::Overwinter
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| NetworkUpgrade::Sapling
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| NetworkUpgrade::Blossom
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| NetworkUpgrade::Heartwood
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| NetworkUpgrade::Canopy => Err(TransactionError::UnsupportedByNetworkUpgrade(
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transaction.version(),
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network_upgrade,
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)),
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}
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}
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/// Verifies if a transaction's transparent `inputs` are valid using the provided
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/// `script_verifier`.
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fn verify_transparent_inputs_and_outputs(
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request: &Request,
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network: Network,
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inputs: &[transparent::Input],
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script_verifier: script::Verifier<ZS>,
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) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError> {
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let transaction = request.transaction();
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if transaction.is_coinbase() {
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// The script verifier only verifies PrevOut inputs and their corresponding UTXOs.
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// Coinbase transactions don't have any PrevOut inputs.
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Ok(AsyncChecks::new())
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} else {
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// feed all of the inputs to the script and shielded verifiers
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// the script_verifier also checks transparent sighashes, using its own implementation
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let cached_ffi_transaction = Arc::new(CachedFfiTransaction::new(transaction));
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let known_utxos = request.known_utxos();
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let upgrade = request.upgrade(network);
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let script_checks = (0..inputs.len())
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.into_iter()
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.map(move |input_index| {
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let request = script::Request {
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upgrade,
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known_utxos: known_utxos.clone(),
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cached_ffi_transaction: cached_ffi_transaction.clone(),
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input_index,
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};
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script_verifier.clone().oneshot(request)
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})
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.collect();
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Ok(script_checks)
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}
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}
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/// Verifies a transaction's Sprout shielded join split data.
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fn verify_sprout_shielded_data(
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joinsplit_data: &Option<transaction::JoinSplitData<Groth16Proof>>,
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shielded_sighash: &blake2b_simd::Hash,
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) -> AsyncChecks {
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let mut checks = AsyncChecks::new();
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if let Some(joinsplit_data) = joinsplit_data {
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// XXX create a method on JoinSplitData
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// that prepares groth16::Items with the correct proofs
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// and proof inputs, handling interstitial treestates
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// correctly.
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// Then, pass those items to self.joinsplit to verify them.
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// Consensus rule: The joinSplitSig MUST represent a
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// valid signature, under joinSplitPubKey, of the
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// sighash.
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//
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// Queue the validation of the JoinSplit signature while
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// adding the resulting future to our collection of
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// async checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
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// transaction to verify.
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//
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// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#sproutnonmalleability
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// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#txnencodingandconsensus
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let ed25519_verifier = primitives::ed25519::VERIFIER.clone();
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let ed25519_item =
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(joinsplit_data.pub_key, joinsplit_data.sig, shielded_sighash).into();
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checks.push(ed25519_verifier.oneshot(ed25519_item));
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}
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checks
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}
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/// Verifies a transaction's Sapling shielded data.
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fn verify_sapling_shielded_data<A>(
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sapling_shielded_data: &Option<sapling::ShieldedData<A>>,
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shielded_sighash: &blake2b_simd::Hash,
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) -> Result<AsyncChecks, TransactionError>
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where
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A: sapling::AnchorVariant + Clone,
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sapling::Spend<sapling::PerSpendAnchor>: From<(sapling::Spend<A>, A::Shared)>,
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{
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let mut async_checks = AsyncChecks::new();
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if let Some(sapling_shielded_data) = sapling_shielded_data {
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for spend in sapling_shielded_data.spends_per_anchor() {
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// Consensus rule: cv and rk MUST NOT be of small
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// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]rk
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// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
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//
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// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#spenddesc
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check::spend_cv_rk_not_small_order(&spend)?;
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// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKSpend MUST be valid
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// given a primary input formed from the other
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// fields except spendAuthSig.
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//
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// Queue the verification of the Groth16 spend proof
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// for each Spend description while adding the
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// resulting future to our collection of async
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// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
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// transaction to verify.
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async_checks.push(
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primitives::groth16::SPEND_VERIFIER
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.clone()
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.oneshot(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(&spend).into()),
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);
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// Consensus rule: The spend authorization signature
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// MUST be a valid SpendAuthSig signature over
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// SigHash using rk as the validating key.
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//
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// Queue the validation of the RedJubjub spend
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// authorization signature for each Spend
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// description while adding the resulting future to
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// our collection of async checks that (at a
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// minimum) must pass for the transaction to verify.
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async_checks.push(
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primitives::redjubjub::VERIFIER
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.clone()
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.oneshot((spend.rk, spend.spend_auth_sig, shielded_sighash).into()),
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);
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}
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for output in sapling_shielded_data.outputs() {
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// Consensus rule: cv and wpk MUST NOT be of small
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// order, i.e. [h_J]cv MUST NOT be 𝒪_J and [h_J]wpk
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// MUST NOT be 𝒪_J.
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//
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// https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#outputdesc
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check::output_cv_epk_not_small_order(output)?;
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// Consensus rule: The proof π_ZKOutput MUST be
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// valid given a primary input formed from the other
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// fields except C^enc and C^out.
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//
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// Queue the verification of the Groth16 output
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// proof for each Output description while adding
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// the resulting future to our collection of async
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// checks that (at a minimum) must pass for the
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// transaction to verify.
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async_checks.push(
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primitives::groth16::OUTPUT_VERIFIER
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.clone()
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.oneshot(primitives::groth16::ItemWrapper::from(output).into()),
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);
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}
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let bvk = sapling_shielded_data.binding_verification_key();
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// TODO: enable async verification and remove this block - #1939
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{
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let item: zebra_chain::primitives::redjubjub::batch::Item =
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(bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into();
|
||
item.verify_single().unwrap_or_else(|binding_sig_error| {
|
||
let binding_sig_error = binding_sig_error.to_string();
|
||
tracing::warn!(%binding_sig_error, "ignoring");
|
||
metrics::counter!("zebra.error.sapling.binding",
|
||
1,
|
||
"kind" => binding_sig_error);
|
||
});
|
||
// Ignore errors until binding signatures are fixed
|
||
//.map_err(|e| BoxError::from(Box::new(e)))?;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TODO: stop ignoring binding signature errors - #1939
|
||
// async_checks.push(
|
||
// primitives::redjubjub::VERIFIER
|
||
// .clone()
|
||
// .oneshot((bvk, sapling_shielded_data.binding_sig, &shielded_sighash).into()),
|
||
// );
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
Ok(async_checks)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// A set of unordered asynchronous checks that should succeed.
|
||
///
|
||
/// A wrapper around [`FuturesUnordered`] with some auxiliary methods.
|
||
struct AsyncChecks(FuturesUnordered<Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<(), BoxError>> + Send>>>);
|
||
|
||
impl AsyncChecks {
|
||
/// Create an empty set of unordered asynchronous checks.
|
||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||
AsyncChecks(FuturesUnordered::new())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Push a check into the set.
|
||
pub fn push(&mut self, check: impl Future<Output = Result<(), BoxError>> + Send + 'static) {
|
||
self.0.push(check.boxed());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Push a set of checks into the set.
|
||
///
|
||
/// This method can be daisy-chained.
|
||
pub fn and(mut self, checks: AsyncChecks) -> Self {
|
||
self.0.extend(checks.0);
|
||
self
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Wait until all checks in the set finish.
|
||
///
|
||
/// If any of the checks fail, this method immediately returns the error and cancels all other
|
||
/// checks by dropping them.
|
||
async fn check(mut self) -> Result<(), BoxError> {
|
||
// Wait for all asynchronous checks to complete
|
||
// successfully, or fail verification if they error.
|
||
while let Some(check) = self.0.next().await {
|
||
tracing::trace!(?check, remaining = self.0.len());
|
||
check?;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
Ok(())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl<F> FromIterator<F> for AsyncChecks
|
||
where
|
||
F: Future<Output = Result<(), BoxError>> + Send + 'static,
|
||
{
|
||
fn from_iter<I>(iterator: I) -> Self
|
||
where
|
||
I: IntoIterator<Item = F>,
|
||
{
|
||
AsyncChecks(iterator.into_iter().map(FutureExt::boxed).collect())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|